even that it was the best example available of normative ethics on a philosophical (rather than a religious) foundation. So Kierkegaard's use of Fichte as a foil was the perfectly obvious choice in the context. That is a curious fact, given the complete obscurity of Fichte's ethics today, and one whose interest should not be confined to Kierkegaard scholars.
In the first section of this paper I will present a small part of what turns out to be a large body of evidence for Fichte's prominence in the landscape of philosophical ethics in the 1830s and '40s in Germany and Denmark. In the second section I will reiterate, very briefly, some of the substantive and textual reasons for thinking Fichte was the figure looming largest in the background of Kierkegaard's construction of the ethical standpoint in Either/Or.
Ethics as a philosophical project: the view from 1843
I take it we can agree that anyone who seeks to read Either/Or in its context needs to know something about what the philosophical project of articulating an ethical life-view that would be independent of any religious convictions might have seemed to require around 1841-42. I will spend most of this section looking at one source: I.H. Fichte's survey article "Der bisherige Zustand der praktischen Philosophie in seinen Umrissen," published in the Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie in 1843. This is an interesting document for two reasons.
First, it is an account by a then-prominent historian of philosophy of the state of the field of philosophical ethics in the German language realm looking back over the preceding 50 years. Second, it is nearly exactly contemporaneous with Either/Or (it was published a few months later). Obviously, it was not a source for Kierkegaard. But it is an interesting source for us, on the assumption that Kierkegaard was in some sense taking the pulse of contemporary approaches to ethics in Either/Or II. This article gives us an independent, contemporaneous pulse-taking to use as a comparison.
I.H. Fichte was J.G. Fichte's son and the editor of his father's collected works. 2 But that does not give us reason to think he overplays his father's importance in this article. J.G. Fichte's ethics gets about the same proportional attention here that it gets in surveys of the same literature by Michelet, Chalybäus, Martensen, and others in the period, and the assessment of it is not very different. (I will discuss those other sources at the end of this section.) The younger Fichte did not share many philosophical commitments with the elder, and his treatment of his father's work in his other historical writings is even-handed. He was also very influential in the academic philosophy of the time. (Although no one reads him anymore, Kierkegaard certainly did read him.
3 )
His discussion in the article focuses on Kant, J.G. Fichte, Hegel, and Schleiermacher.
The diagnosis of the situation in philosophical ethics in 1843 is as follows below. 1) grounds an account of duty, virtue, and the good life; and that 2) is normative rather than descriptive (that is, proceeds from the standpoint of the deliberating agent and is action-guiding). A unified account of virtue, duty and the good life is required to show how it is possible that the individual be able to see his ethical disposition reconciled with every form of life available to him because he is able to understand the objective forms of the ethical world as the ones that are the best means for the self-realization of each individual personality. 16 A normative principle is required because the addressee should be the individual in the situation of ethical deliberation.
Schleiermacher's later work, 17 I.H. Fichte argues, shows us how to make good on the first desideratum, but fails miserably on the second, the demand that ethics be normative, 'imperatival,' from the agent's point of view. Schleiermacher's later ethics is a piece of descriptive philosophy, placed systematically somewhere between philosophy of nature and philosophy of history; the moral law is not an ought, but a description -it is the nature (in the most literal sense) of the rational will. Ethics becomes a part of physics. 18 Schleiermacher's effort seemed promising in its outlines but was disappointing in its details (in part because of its determinism and its commitment to seeing ethics as a descriptive rather than prescriptive discipline; in part simply because it remained too poorly worked out). The tendency in recent decades (since the 1810s) to assimilate ethics to philosophy of history has been somewhere between puzzling and deplorable (depending on the source). 
Wilhelm and Fichte on practical reasoning
It would be too generous to say that Either/Or II contains an account of practical reasoning; at best it contains a gesture at such an account. Still, some commitments can be drawn fairly straightforwardly from the text, and others can be assumed as the 2. The Judge is a reasons/motives internalist (according to one way of categorizing internalisms): we are always motivated (to at least some degree) to act according to the all-things-considered reasons that we are aware of having (and, given
(1), according to the ethical reasons that we are aware of having). In fact the Judge seems to think that we cannot fail to be moved all the way to action by the all-thingsconsidered reasons we take ourselves to have. Where agents go wrong is not in the transition from concluding practical deliberation to forming an intention, but instead in failing to put sufficient effort into the process of deliberation itself. Willing the right thing is a matter of willing with utmost energy --not because willing with utmost energy directly guarantees the right choice, but because it guarantees one's apprehension of the correct thing to do, and that guarantees the right choice. 28 That is why, for the Judge, there is no radical evil in the Kantian sense. 29 3. The Judge is an autonomist about ethical reasons: the self or the will is the source of the authority ethical reasons have. To be a self is essentially to be an agent and agency is itself the source of universally binding ethical norms. 30 The individual becomes an ethical individual by becoming 'transparent to himself' and the good that is chosen is the true self that comes into view in this transparency. 31 The object of ethical choice is oneself in one's eternal validity; alternatively, the absolute, which is also oneself. 4. The Judge takes intentions (rather than actions or their consequences) to be the object of ethical evaluation and the primary locus of moral worth. We can see this for instance in his contrast between 'inner' and 'outer' deed. 33 The outer deed is the physical action and the range of consequences it produces; it determines how the individual will be judged from a historical point of view. But the agent cannot control that outcome, nor even accurately predict it. What is under the agent's control is the inner deed (the decision or intention); and this determines how the individual is judged from the ethical point of view.
The Judge believes that sincere individual practical deliberation (whatever has the voice of conscience as its outcome) is in some sense incorrigible. No one can know
what an individual's duty is better than that individual himself. 34 This ultimate authority of individual conscience is compatible with an ethical demand of openness: one is required to share one's reasons and subject them to others' scrutiny. But there is no place for deference to authority in ethical deliberation. All that anyone can do in the way of assuring herself of the validity of her conclusions is to put all the effort she can muster into reaching them. And there is reason to be optimistic about the outcome of this process: even if the choice turns out to have been mistaken, it will not be so radically mistaken that the mistake remains hidden for long. 35 6. The Judge sees a sort of universality as the hallmark of the ethical. But he denies that this is because practical deliberation consists in the application of an abstract universal law or principle to a concrete situation. 36 Instead deliberation involves taking stock of one's concrete situation and coming to a judgment about what that situation demands. The product of practical deliberation is a highly specific imperative.
That imperative claims universal validity, but all that means is that it claims to be the only conclusion anyone relevantly similarly situated could be expected to arrive at. It is universally valid because correct, not correct because universally valid. We see this commitment in the Judge's repeated emphasis that transforming oneself into an ethical individual, expressing the universal in one's life, involves the transformation but not the elimination of one's concrete particularity. 37 Now, if we ask with whom, in the historical context, these six commitments are shared, the answer will be: (1-4) are shared with Kant; (1-2) and perhaps (6) unjustified. 39 We go wrong mainly in being insufficiently reflective, and so failing to achieve the feeling of certainty that would be the voice of conscience. So the right advice to someone worried about his own virtue is: apply more energy to the process of practical deliberation. And knowing one has tried one's hardest is a fair assurance of success. Fichte -like the Judge -denies the existence of radical evil in the Kantian sense. 40 Kant and Fichte also agree (3) that the will is the source of the norms authoritative for it. Fichte -like the Judge -does not embrace Kant's term 'autonomy' as his own, but he does argue that his account of ethics is 'autonomous' in Kant's sense. 41 And, finally, Fichte agrees with Kant (4) that the fundamental locus of moral worth is the agent's will. 42 Kant and Fichte diverge on (5), and once again Fichte and the Judge are on one side, Kant on the other. Fichte claimed that conscience cannot be said to err because it cannot be verified against any other sort of consciousness; it knows no judge higher than itself. 43 In particular, it cannot be replaced by the judgment of an authority: a necessary condition of attaining the feeling of certainty that is a necessary condition of morally correct action is that the subject have actually come to a judgment himself. 44 But this ultimate authority of individual conscience is consistent with a demand for ethical transparency 45 and openness to ethical persuasion by others. 46 And since moral ends are in important respects collective and require coordination, consensus on what achieving them requires is often necessary, and can only be reached through a process of ethical dialogue. 47 But despite the expectation of consensus and the obligation to reach it, the authority of individual conscience is absolute; it is always wrong to try to cause someone to follow your conscience rather than his, 48 and it is always wrong to bow to any external moral authority. 49 Kant had a different view. Though he agreed that we cannot speak of an 'erring conscience,' that is because conscience is what monitors whether the individual has subjected his maxims to the categorical imperative test, and no one can be wrong about that. But people can be wrong about whether something passes the test or not, for all sorts of reasons that are publicly discernible.
For Kant ethical deliberation is about the application of the categorical imperative test to maxims, and to the extent that maxims can be inferred from behavior, so can their failure to pass the test. But Fichte does not think of narrowly moral reasoning as the application of a procedural constraint to the results of technically-practical prudential reasoning. He thinks that all practical reasoning is technical-practical. 50 It is always reasoning about what would bring about, or what would constitute the achievement of, a given end. There is one final end, to which all other ends are subordinate, and that is:
self-determination. But that end is not something anyone reasons about whether to adopt, because it is itself partially constitutive of agency. Coupled with beliefs about the deliberator's particular circumstances and background beliefs about natural laws and empirical regularities, the process of deliberation results in each case in a unique imperative: 'do x,' where x is the action that best fulfills the demands of the ethical drive. 51 The result, accompanied by a feeling of certainty and backed motivationally and justificatorily by the drive to self-determination, is the voice of conscience, the 'immediate consciousness of our determinate duty.' 52 Given that account of practical deliberation, it is no surprise that Fichte was also careful to distinguish his view from Kant's on point (6). Here again the Judge sides with
Fichte. Fichte described the result of the process of practical deliberation as an imperative (an ought) whose character is universal in that it (implicitly) claims to be the one any rational agent in exactly this situation with exactly this set of background beliefs would, on sufficient reflection, come to. The moral law demands that we act as if we were 'everyman'; Fichte claims that this is the real meaning of Kant's formula of universal law. 53 The result of practical reasoning is universally valid because correct, not correct because universally valid. 54 So the correct statement of the categorical imperative, according to Fichte, is: 'always act according to your best conviction of your duty; or: act according to your conscience.' 55 The distance between Wilhelm and Hegel on these six points is greater: they agree only (1) that practical reason has no higher court of appeal than the ethical. (More precisely, they agree if here we mean the sittliche-qua-social-morality rather than the Moral abstracted from its socio-historical location and the norms that are peculiar to it.
Without that assumption they agree on none of the six points.) Hegel denies (3) and (4) explicitly. He denies (5) stridently, taking issue in both the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Philosophy of Right with this Fichtean idea as it had played itself out in Romanticism and the ethical subjectivism of the likes of Fries. 56 He objected that in elevating the deliverances of individual conscience over the universal ethical life of the community, the ethics of subjective conviction leads to hypocrisy and evil. Hegel does not explicitly deny (2), but its negation seems to be entailed by some of his other commitments. He thought it necessary that a person be brought up in a certain way, be habituated to have the moral sensibility that allows him to pick up on and be moved by the duties that there are where he is. That is externalist talk: ethical reasons move us only insofar as we are disposed to take them as reasons, but that disposition is not itself inevitable. Finally, (6) does not describe anything about the deliberating standpoint for a Hegelian agent (though it is an apt description of what ethical life brings about for an individual: that his particularity, which need be all he consciously concerns himself with, is nevertheless suffused with the universal). 13 Notice that what seems most dated about Hegel's Philosophy of Right is precisely his account of the forms of ethical life (his insistence, for instance, that the state must take the form of a constitutional monarchy (G.W.F. Hegel 1986 vol. 7 § § 257-320, pp. 398-490) or the family the traditional nuclear form with the wife subordinate and her activity confined to the home (G.W.F. Hegel 1986 vol. 7 § §158-181, pp. 292-339), in order for these institutions to be genuine expressions of objective spirit. We might be inclined to agree with J.G. Fichte that these forms are justified by their ability to solve moral problems but that many such forms can do that, and which forms are best is a
A concluding observation

